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From the Notion of Life to an Ethics of Life
Abstract
When discussing the concept of life, there is neither a single concept of life, nor absolute 
consensus about a conceptual barycentre, so that consideration of the notion of  life is a 
precondition for establishing and developing an ethics of life, i.e. bioethics. This paper tries 
to sketch the path(s) leading from the notion(s) of life to an ethics of life by recalling some 
remarkable (proto)bioethical conceptions: Hans Jonas’s integrative philosophy of life (philo-
sophical biology and ethics of responsibility), Fritz Jahr’s bio-ethics, Albert Schweitzer’s 
ethics of reverence for life, and Arne Naess’s deep ecology (ecosophy).
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1. The meaning of ‘life’
When discussing the concept of life, there is neither a single concept of life, 




















Hans  Werner  Ingensiep,  “Was  ist  Leben? 
– Grundfragen der Biophilosophie”, in: Jahr-


































environmental  conditions,  etc.),  although  the  first  and  crucial  conceptions 
of  bioethics  suggested  something  different.  The  conceptual  confusion  was 





















situation”,  i.e.,  the context of  the emergence and development of bioethics 
as opposed  to classical  ethics  (and  the worldviews,  cultures,  societies,  and 
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neither bios  nor zoe,  then,  bare  life  emerges 
from  within  this  distinction  and  can  be  de-
fined  as  ‘life  exposed  to  death’,  especially 
in  the  form  of  sovereign  violence”  (ibid.). 
See  also:  Catherine  Mills,  The Philosophy 






sphere of the polis – the politicisation of bare 
life as such – constitutes the decisive event of 
modernity  and  signals  a  radical  transforma-
tion  of  the  political-philosophical  categories 




additional  capacity  for  a  political  existence; 
modern man is an animal whose politics plac-
es his existence as a living being in question” 
(Michel  Foucault,  The History of Sexuality. 
Volume 1: An Introduction, Pantheon Books, 
New York 1978, p. 143).
7
For  the  idea of  integrative bioethics see,  for 
example,	 the	 following	 books:	 Ante	 Čović	
– Thomas Sören Hoffmann (eds.), Integrative 
Bioethik / Integrative Bioethics,  Academia 
Verlag,	 Sankt	 Augustin	 2007;	 Ante	 Čović	
(ed.),  Integrative Bioethik und Pluriper-
spektivismus / Integrative Bioethics and 
Pluri-perspectivism, Academia Verlag, Sankt 
Augustin  2011; Amir  Muzur  –  Hans-Martin 
Sass  (eds.),  Fritz Jahr and the Foundations 
of Global Bioethics. The Future of Integrative 
Bioethics, LIT Verlag, Münster et al. 2012.
8
More  extensive  reflections  on  Hans  Jonas’s 
contributions  to  the  “ethics  of  life”  can  be 
found  in  my  paper  “Hans  Jonas’  Integrative 
Philosophy of Life as a Foothold for Integra-
tive  Bioethics”,  in: A.  Muzur  –  H.-M.  Sass 
(eds.),  Fritz Jahr and the Foundations of 
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The ethical  implications of Jonas’s philosophy of  life are clearly  indicated. 

















“Bio-ethics:  Reviewing  the  Ethical  Relations  of  Humans  towards Animals 
and Plants”.20



































vornosti Hansa Jonasa (Hans Jonas’s Ethics 
of Responsibility), Pergamena, Zagreb 2010.
9
See  Hans  Jonas,  The Imperative of Respon-
sibility. In Search of an Ethics for the Techno-
logical Age,  University  of  Chicago  Press, 
Chicago 1984.
10
See Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life. To-
ward a Philosophical Biology, Northwestern 
University Press, Evanston 2001.
11
Hans  Jonas,  Erkenntnis und Verantwortung. 
Gespräch mit Ingo Hermann in der Reihe 























and the Foundations of Global Bioethics, as 
well as  the book, published  in Croatian,  Iva 
Rinčić	 –	Amir	Muzur,	Fritz Jahr i rađanje 
europske bioetike (Fritz Jahr and the Emer-




Relations  of  Humans  towards  Animals  and 
Plants”,  in:  A.  Muzur  –  H.-M.  Sass  (eds.), 






H.	 Jurić,	 From	 the	 Notion	 of	 Life	 to	 an	
Ethics of Life38

















Jahr  present  his  “categorical  imperative”  as  the  “bio-ethical  imperative”, 
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2.3. Albert Schweitzer’s ethics of reverence for life
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Fritz Jahr and the Foundations of Global 
Bioethics, p. 33.
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Albert  Schweitzer,  Out of My Life and 
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much less evil than thoughtless exploitation, torture, and killing. Anyhow, we 
should be aware of  the fact  that we, as humans,  live not only  in  the human 
world, but also in the natural world, in the world of living nature, which has its 
own dignity, or at least value, which should be recognised and respected.
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Bill  Devall  –  George  Sessions,  Deep Ecology. 
































scheme  the  traditional concept of human dignity, which  includes  the  tradi-
tional concepts of freedom and autonomy, as well as the ability and the right 





































cal  duties,  although  it  would  have  to  emphasise  exactly  the  basic  equality 






































anthropomorphism”  in:  H.  Jonas,  The Phe-
nomenon of Life, especially pp. 33–37.
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4. The ‘exhibition’ of life
By recalling Jonas, Jahr, Schweitzer and Naess, we can at least conclude that 









              profits, conformities,
Which too long I was offering to feed my soul,
Clear to me now standards not yet publish’d, clear to me




              yet contains all the rest (…).”51
A differently set approach to life – which can also be found in Jonas, Jahr, 
Schweitzer and Naess – could start with a Whitmanian “phenomenological 
reduction” of  life  to “life  that does not exhibit  itself”  through  the matrices 


























See,  for  example,  the  chapter  “Emotion, 
Value,  and  Reality”  bringing  the  following 
passage:  “In  a  discussion  of  value  thinking, 
it  is  essential  to  clarify  the  relationship  be-
tween spontaneous feelings, their expression 
through  our  vibrant  voices,  and  statements 
of  value  or  announcement  of  norms  moti-
vated by  strong  feelings  but  having  a  clear 
cognitive  function.  (…)  In  these  statements, 
feelings are closely tied to intention. (…) In 
short,  value  statements  are  normally  made 
with positive or negative feeling, and it would 
be nonsensical to ask for neutrality. (…) It is 
thus  unwarranted  to  require  that  feeling  be 
eliminated  in  an  impartial  discussion.  If  the 
debate  is  to proceed  in depth,  these  feelings 
should be clarified, and made explicit as the 
need  arises.  Specific  personal,  idiosyncratic 
components must be sorted out if the debate is 
concerned with more or less general norms.” 




tive  of  the  idea  of  animal  protection”,  Jahr 
says  that  “compassion  with  animals  shows 
up  as  an  empirically  given  phenomenon  of 
the human soul” (Fritz Jahr, “Animal Protec-
tion and Ethics”, in: A. Muzur – H.-M. Sass, 







A. Schweitzer, Indian Thought and Its Devel-
opment, p. 84.
49
Leonardo  Boff,  Essential Care. An Ethics 
of Human Nature,  Baylor  University  Press, 
Waco 2008, p. 14.
50




all  the  circumstances  and  all  the  aspirations 
of  the  will  to  live,  its  pleasure,  too,  and  its 





Works of Walt Whitman,  Wordsworth  Edi-
tions, Ware 1995, p. 106.
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Hrvoje Jurić
Od pojma života do etike života
Sažetak
Nema jednog i jedinstvenog pojma života, a nema ni apsolutnog konsenzusa oko konceptualnog 
težišta u raspravama o pojmu života, tako da je razmatranje pojma	života preduvjet utemeljenja 
i razvijanja etike	života, tj. bioetike. U ovom radu nastojimo ocrtati put koji vodi od pojma 
života do etike života, uzimajući u obzir nekoliko upečatljivih (proto)bioetičkih koncepcija: inte-
grativnu filozofiju života (filozofijsku biologiju i etiku odgovornosti) Hansa Jonasa, bio-etiku 





Vom Lebensbegriff bis zu einer Ethik des Lebens
Zusammenfassung
Es gibt keinen einen und einzigartigen Lebensbegriff, und es gibt keinen absoluten Konsens 
über den konzeptuellen Schwerpunkt in den Abhandlungen über den Lebensbegriff, sodass die 
Betrachtung des Lebensbegriffs eine Vorbedingung zur Grundlegung und Entwicklung einer 
Ethik des Lebens bzw. Bioethik ist. In dieser Arbeit streben wir an, den Weg vom Lebensbegriff 
bis zu einer Lebensethik auszumalen, indem wir etliche einprägsame (proto)bioethische Kon-
zeptionen berücksichtigen: integrative Philosophie des Lebens (philosophische Biologie und 
Verantwortungsethik) Hans Jonas’, Bio-Ethik Fritz Jahrs, Ethik der Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben 




Du concept de vie à l’éthique de vie
Résumé
Il n’y a pas un seul et unique concept de vie, et il n’y a pas non plus de consensus absolu autour 
du noyau conceptuel dans les débats sur le concept de vie, de telle manière que l’examen de 
ce concept est une précondition pour fonder et développer une éthique de vie, à savoir une 
bioéthique. Nous nous appliquons dans ce travail à tracer le chemin qui mène du concept de 
vie au concept éthique de vie, en prenant en considération quelques conceptions sensibles de 
(proto)bioéthique: la philosophie intégrative de la vie (la biologie philosophique et l’éthique de 
responsabilité) de Hans Jonas, la bioéthique de Fritz Jahr, l’éthique du respect de la vie d’Al-
bert Schweitzer et l’écologie profonde (l’écosophie) d’Arne Naess.
Mots-clés
vie, bioéthique, Hans Jonas, Fritz Jahr, Albert Schweitzer, Arne Naess
